Casey Michel is an author, journalist, and director of the Combating Kleptocracy Program with the Human Rights Foundation. He is the author of American Kleptocracy, named by The Economist as one of the ‘best books to read to understand financial crime.’ He has also testified in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the links between illicit financial networks and national security.
In his latest book, Foreign Agents, Casey conducts a stunning investigation and indictment of a segment of the United States’ foreign lobbying industry, and the threat to end democracy. He notes that, “For years, one group of Americans has worked as foot-soldiers for the most authoritarian regimes around the planet. In the process, they’ve not only entrenched dictatorships and spread kleptocratic networks, but they’ve secretly guided U.S. policy without the rest of America even being aware. And now, some of them have begun turning their sights on American democracy itself. These Americans are known as foreign lobbyists, and many of them spent years ushering dictatorships directly into the halls of Washington, all while laundering the reputations of the most heinous, repressive regimes in the process.”
In this interview, I speak to Casey Michel on the scale and scope of the foreign lobbying industry and the very real threat it poses to global security.
Q: What (and who) are the foreign lobbying industry?
[Casey Michel]: The foreign lobbying industry, as it currently exists and as I discuss in the book, certainly includes traditional lobbyists. Most people have a general understanding of what lobbyists do, whether in Washington, Ottawa, Canberra, London, or elsewhere. These firms and individuals are indeed a significant part of the foreign lobbying industry in the United States, which is the focus of my book.
However, in recent years, the industry has evolved—it’s really exploded, as I describe. Over the past few decades, it has become a multi-billion dollar industry. We’re not just talking about a few firms or individuals anymore; it has expanded to include much more. Now, the industry encompasses public relations agencies, law firms, leading consultancies, and in the United States, many former members of Congress, both from the House of Representatives and the Senate. It increasingly includes think tanks and even universities.
So, what we’re seeing is a broad constellation of nominally independent subsets, even entire industries, that have now come under the umbrella of the foreign lobbying industry. All of these entities have been transformed into go-to vehicles and mouthpieces for foreign regimes, particularly dictatorships, eager to access the halls of power in Washington, launder their images, and, of course, influence Americans both in Congress and beyond.
Q: What is the toolkit of the foreign lobbying industry?
[Casey Michel]: The toolkit is ever-expanding and ever-evolving. Before diving into the details, it’s important to remind listeners that in the United States, lobbying, despite its often deservedly sordid reputation, is a constitutionally protected right. The First Amendment of the American Constitution, among other rights, includes the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances—essentially, a formal way of describing lobbying. Whether you’re contacting your legislators or rallying a group to advocate for a cause, that’s what lobbying is.
Throughout much of the 21st century, lobbying has transformed and grown significantly. As I mentioned earlier, it has exploded into a multi-billion dollar industry with dedicated firms, networks, and avenues for influencing politicians. Foreign regimes, kleptocratic networks, and oligarchs have taken full advantage of this.
In some cases, lobbyists arrange simple sit-down meetings with legislators, members of foreign relations committees, or officials in the White House—perhaps not directly with the president, but certainly with advisors and officials who have access to the highest levels of American power. This is traditional lobbying as we typically understand it, but it goes far beyond that.
There’s no exhaustive list of what these lobbyists do because their activities are so varied. For example, they often organize junkets—trips for American legislators to visit the countries that are paying for these lobbyists. These trips aren’t meant to expose legislators to dissidents, opposition journalists, or human rights activists. Instead, they serve to launder the image of these regimes. One story I detail in the book involves an invitation I received to visit Azerbaijan. I had to decline because they wanted me to write nothing but positive reviews of the regime. They took over a dozen members of Congress on this trip, treating them to lavish dinners, fireworks displays, and gifts like thousand-dollar rugs and crystal tea sets. As I recall, they even received DVDs extolling the virtues of the ruling dictator, who remains in power to this day. This example encapsulates what some of these junkets involve.
Beyond these junkets, there are more public-facing activities, such as media campaigns, hosted events, and high-level donations to think tanks and universities. These institutions, in turn, can host events or reach out to scholars and students, all with the goal of improving the regime’s image.
Recently, we’ve learned that it’s no longer just PR firms, consultancies, and law firms involved in this. Some foreign dictatorial regimes are bypassing traditional lobbying shops altogether and directly recruiting sitting members of Congress to act as foreign agents. In the book, I discuss an afterword about an American senator, Bob Menendez from New Jersey, who was convicted of acting as an agent for Egypt’s ruling military dictatorship. Menendez, one of the most powerful members of the Senate, secretly lobbied his colleagues, ghostwrote for the Egyptian government, and provided highly sensitive information to his Egyptian handlers. This is just one of several recent cases involving the highest ranks of the American political establishment.
Q: How is technology playing a role in the toolkit of foreign lobbyists?
[Casey Michel]: We’ve seen indications that data leaks or other forms of leverage, as traditionally understood—something to hang over the heads of legislators or officials—are at least being considered by some of these regimes. While we haven’t yet seen an instance where hacking campaigns or compromising situations, elements typically associated with spy-craft and espionage, have fully infiltrated the foreign lobbying space, there are troubling signs.
Some legislators and officials have found themselves in compromising situations, later being charged or, in the case of Menendez, convicted. These situations could easily be used as blackmail or leverage, pushing them to continue doing the bidding of the foreign regime in question.
It’s important to note that this isn’t just limited to the regimes people often worry about—like Russia, China, Iran, or Venezuela. While these countries are certainly involved, it’s also happening with regimes that are nominal partners of the United States. For instance, besides the Egyptian case study I mentioned earlier, a member of the House of Representatives was recently found to have allegedly accepted tens of thousands of dollars in sham funding from Azerbaijan’s dictatorship. Just a few weeks ago, a former White House official was indicted for, among other things, accepting luxury handbags from members of South Korea’s intelligence apparatus, effectively becoming a foreign agent for the South Korean government.
These examples show that even America’s nominal partners and allies are engaging in these practices.
Q: How do financial flows enable foreign lobbyists?
[Casey Michel]: If I may take a moment for a shameless self-plug, my first book, American Kleptocracy, which came out a few years ago, delves precisely into the development of financial secrecy tools in the United States. It covers topics like anonymous shell companies in Delaware, anonymous trusts in states like South Dakota, and the American real estate and private equity industries. These are all mechanisms that regimes use to move, hide, and launder their funds within the American economy, often without anyone knowing where the money ultimately ends up.
My new book, Foreign Agents, complements that first book by exploring the foreign lobbying apparatus as an extension of these broader financial secrecy networks and secretive financial flows. It’s important to remember that, despite all the sordid details and allegations, these regimes use foreign lobbyists and lobbying networks not just to launder their image or access the highest levels of American policymakers, but to maintain power indefinitely.
Their goal is to enrich themselves, their families, and their inner circles while impoverishing local populations and looting essential budgets like health, education, and infrastructure. They see foreign lobbyists as tools to redirect American policy in ways that help them stay in power—whether by securing military or economic aid or by pushing specific agendas favourable to their regimes. And, of course, they continue to use those anonymous financial secrecy tools to further enrich themselves.
[Vikas: but cutting off these flows is a real risk to nations]
[Casey Michel]: You mentioned the role of corporate lobbying, particularly in the American context, and it brings to mind how lobbyists representing industries like American real estate or private equity and hedge funds have been among the staunchest opponents of increased transparency requirements and regulations. They are fully aware of how these industries have benefited—and even thrived—over the past decade or two by attracting questionable or illicit capital.
This resistance to transparency is part of a broader network that has been in place for years. While it might be a bit optimistic to think things can change quickly, it’s been fascinating to observe the interplay between policy proposals out of Washington and London, and the successes we’ve seen in recent years in this space.
Two examples come to mind. First, you mentioned the British real estate sector, which has seen significant investments from Russian, Saudi, Azeri, Kazakh, and Emirati sources, among others. One recent success in British policy is the introduction of a new offshore property registry. If I recall correctly, properties owned in the UK by offshore entities must now disclose their beneficial ownership to British regulators. This is a policy that the United States should absolutely replicate, if not surpass.
Second, there’s the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) in the United States, which requires foreign lobbying networks to disclose their activities, the amounts involved, and their compensation. Recently, the UK introduced similar legislation—the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme—which is expected to come online later this year. Ideally, it will replicate the successes seen in the U.S.
This dynamic of learning and adapting across borders is a bit of an under-told story, but it’s fascinating to see how nations, activists, and journalists in different countries are learning from one another in responding to these kleptocratic networks.
Q: Do you think we can get foreign lobbying under control?
[Casey Michel]: …people often don’t realize just how grave the threat is, how it continues to grow, and how it will persist for the foreseeable future. This was one of the primary reasons I wrote the book in the first place. The first step is raising awareness—awareness of the threats, the scale of the responsible parties, and the policies that need either reform or enactment.
One of the key narrative elements of the book isn’t centered around a single figure or firm, but rather a piece of policy I mentioned earlier: the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). This law requires foreign lobbyists and their firms to disclose their activities to the federal government and, by extension, to the American public. They must reveal what they’re doing, who they’re doing it for, and how much money they’re making in the process.
FARA isn’t a new piece of legislation; it dates back to the 1930s when American legislators discovered extensive pro-Nazi lobbying networks, including prominent figures in the American public relations industry who were effectively acting as Nazi lobbyists. They realized that transparency in this space was essential.
However, as with any policy solution, having progressive legislation is meaningless if it’s not enforced. If regulators are asleep at the wheel, the policy is hardly worth the paper it’s written on. This is precisely what happened with FARA—it fell into disuse for decades, until the mid-2010s when figures like Donald Trump brought to light just how vulnerable legislators were, and still are, to foreign influence. This realization underscored the critical need for these regulations to be actively enforced.
Q: How do we encourage the moral imperative in officials?
[Casey Michel]: I would love to believe it’s possible that the better angels of legislators in the United States and across the democratic world might one day find the strength to reject these firms, individuals, and networks that seek to influence and tilt policy. While I’m not sure I’ll live long enough to see that, perhaps my grandchildren might.
It’s worth noting that the original rationale behind the creation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act wasn’t to ban lobbying altogether—after all, lobbying is a constitutionally protected right—but rather to bring transparency to the sector. The idea was that the American public, or legislators themselves, could shame foreign lobbyists into dropping dictatorial clients. It’s a lovely, though somewhat quaint, notion at this point, as we haven’t seen much evidence of it working in practice.
Unfortunately, even when some firms or legislators do say no—whether on the lobbying side or in the realm of kleptocratic financial secrecy—they do so knowing that the regime or dictator in question can simply shop around for a competitor who will say yes. This is the harsh reality of the situation.
One example that comes to mind, where shame seemed to work temporarily, is the case of Saudi Arabia in the late 2010s. After Mohammed bin Salman seized power, he was implicated in the gruesome murder of Jamal Khashoggi, an American journalist working for The Washington Post, who was dismembered in the Saudi consulate in Turkey. At the time, this appeared to be an inflection point. Several firms and figures in the United States refused to do business with MBS and his regime, citing the incident as a bridge too far.
For a moment, it seemed that shame was effective. However, this shame had an expiration date. Just a few years later, more firms began signing up to represent Saudi Arabia, and even the Biden administration reopened its doors to MBS and his inner circle. The American-Saudi partnership strengthened once again, and today, the Saudi foreign lobbying fleet is larger than ever before.